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Cu r r en t  A f f a i r s
in Hui, an influential public intellectual and histo-
rian from Tsinghua University, proposes allowing
the formation of slums (pinmin ku) to accommo-
date the millions of migrants in Chinese cities. (1)
This seemingly absurd suggestion has attracted much public
attention and discussion. (2) Slums are often regarded as a
symbol of urban deterioration, a source of social problems,
or even as one of the sins of capitalism. Chinese officials are
very proud that the rapid economic development of the past
three decades has not produced the types of problems that
can be found in other developing countries. However, Qin
insists that the absence of slums is even worse than their
presence. (3) Chinese cities have been exempted from this
natural phenomenon, which usually accompanies rapid ur-
banisation, simply because government policy has prohibited
slums from emerging.
Using the Haussmannisation of Paris and apartheid in
South Africa as analogies, Qin explores the institutional dis-
crimination against Chinese migrants, and advocates the
recognition of migrants’ rights to end this injustice. This
rights-based perspective is in contrast to the utilitarian-based
state policy that treats migrants as a necessary yet alienated
labour force. Provoking this tension in the political spectrum,
Qin’s proposal dragged people of different positions, willing
or not, into the deliberation on migrants’ rights.Ra p id urb ani sa tio n unde r thehukou sy ste m
The entrenched polarisation associated with the “opening and
reform” (gaige kaifang) policy that liberalised the labour force
and the household registration (hukou) system that con-
strained rural-urban migration are the sources of Qin’s con-
cern. On the one hand, the economic reforms of the past
three decades have led to rapid urbanisation in China. The
country’s urban population increased from 18 percent of the
total in 1978 to 44 percent in 2006. (4) Urban incomes rose
from 2.57 to 3.27 times those of rural incomes in the same pe-
riod. (5) This discrepancy in pay has motivated the rural popu-
lation to enter urban areas in search of better job opportuni-
ties. On the other hand, the rights and social benefits of this
population are constrained by another policy that was enacted
in 1958—the hukou system. According to this system, individ-
uals are assigned to either an urban or rural household based
on their place of residence. The provision of social benefits,
such as education, housing, and health care, is restricted to the
relevant hukou type. The approval of the authorities is needed
if a member of the rural population wants to move to the city.
When such people leave their county to work in the city, how-
ever, they forfeit their rights and benefits. Local governments
are not obliged to take any responsibility or provide any serv-
ices beyond an individual’s household jurisdiction. (6)
This policy is meant to ensure efficient resource allocation,
the monitoring of criminals, and structural stability, but mi-
grants have gradually become targets of daily exploitation
and social discrimination. (7) The system has served to insti-
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tutionalise the country’s 130 million migrants as second-class
citizens. The problem has intensified with changing norms
regarding these migrants’ residence in urban areas. In
Shanghai, for instance, the percentage of migrants staying in
the city for more than five years increased from 6.3 percent
in 1993 to 24.3 percent in 2003, and whole family migration
is also expected to increase. (8) Such figures belie the suspi-
cion that migrant workers may not have the incentive to set-
tle in a city permanently. Therefore, the provision of suitable
housing for these workers is imperative and pressing. C hi nes e Ha ussm a nnisa tio na nd ri ght s  
Qin insists that the current practice goes beyond the “human-
itarian bottom-line,” as migrants are denied the basic right to
become a genuine part of the city. (9) Citizens in any modern
democratic society either enjoy the liberty to live in slums, or
the state provides adequate welfare benefits to eliminate them,
or a balance is struck between the two. However, migrants in
China are neither entitled to settle down in slums, nor given
welfare benefits to help them avoid doing so. (10) They have be-
come an abandoned population whose premier function is to
serve as a cheap labour force in developed urban areas. They
are allowed to stay in temporary residences provided by their
employers or local landlords on the conditions that they are
employed and regularly registered with the public security
forces. (11) They are not qualified to gain residency status and
are expected to return to their home county after a period of
prolonged unemployment or at retirement—normally after the
age of 35. (12) Local authorities are eager to clear out migrants
when their capacity to serve in the city approaches zero. (13)
Qin describes all these measures as a result of “Chinese
Haussmannisation” — a management principle aimed at pro-
gressive urban modernisation, which in turn leads to wide-
spread grievance among the floating migrants. (14)
Haussmannisation is named for Baron Haussmann, who
was the civic planner responsible for bringing order and
structure to the overcrowded and cramped conditions of
Paris during the Industrial Revolution. Reconstruction
started in 1853 — two years after the Second French Repub-
lic became the Second French Empire under Napoleon III.
The emperor had complete control of the country and was
eager to spend money to make Paris the model of moder-
nity. (15) It is estimated that the total cost of the renovation
was 2.5 billion francs, 44 times the annual budget of France
in 1851. (16) Money and power made Haussmann’s renova-
tion a remarkable success that espoused the axioms of
modernity, progress, and the public interest. (17) Such a proj-
ect incorporates the concept of modernity into the public dis-
course through the transformation of physical urban struc-
tures. (18) As Haussmann wrote: 
These underground galleries [water and sewage
pipes] would be the organs of the metropolis and
function like those of the human body without ever
seeing the light of day. Pure and fresh water, along
with light and heat, would circulate like diverse fluids
whose movement and replenishment sustain life itself.
These liquids would work unseen and maintain pub-
lic health without disrupting the smooth running of
the city and without spoiling its exterior beauty. (19)
The metaphor of the body and urbanisation taught the pub-
lic to distinguish beauty from the beast and to learn what is
legitimate to be seen and what has to be hidden, and en-
sured the triumph of modernity. In Qin’s view, Haussmann’s
Paris was a “beauty manifestation” of an authoritarian
regime that denied the residential and civic rights of the un-
derprivileged. Not only were ordinary citizens detached
from one another based on geographical distance and psy-
chological impulse, but the reconstruction also granted more
living space, grand architecture, and pride to the privileged
in the name of the public interest. (20) Most importantly, it set
a precedent for and legitimated all forms of catastrophic
management by the city thereafter. 
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Indeed, similar scenarios have occurred, with similar justifi-
cations given, in contemporary China. Rural lands are an-
nexed and old buildings are dismantled in the process of
modernising the city. Whilst the majority of the land ac-
quired is used for private property construction and commer-
cial and manufacturing uses, a significant portion is retained
for public fringe benefits. The criterion for accessing these
benefits, however, is based on the hierarchy of officialdom
or the wealth of the state-owned enterprise, not on the need
to provide basic shelter to the poor. According to a report in
China Newsweek, middle-ranked officials in Xinyang City
in Henan Province occupy villas that average 250 m2 in
size, which they obtained through internal allocation; (21) at
the same time, the average living space of migrant workers
in Shanghai is 6 m2, less than one-fortieth of that size. (22) To
Qin, this is an absurd policy that means “the richest have re-
placed the poorest in obtaining public housing in China.” 
The formation of socialised discrimination against the lower
class is perhaps even more striking than this institutional sup-
pression. There have been repeated reports of taxi drivers re-
fusing to allow migrants into their vehicles. (23) Under the im-
pression that these people may not have the money to pay
the fare or worrying that their dirt will adhere to the seats,
which will in turn lead to a penalty during regular traffic in-
spections, numerous taxi drivers simply turn a blind eye to
injured or pregnant migrants who are in desperate need of
their services. (24) These actions have been spontaneous, col-
lective, and legitimated among taxi drivers across time and
space in Chinese cities. The structural cause is that migrants
are viewed with prejudice and seen as dirty, destitute, sav-
age, and servile — the enemies of the modern city. Although
the earning capacity of taxi drivers may be higher than that
of migrants, their origins, ambitions, and job nature put them
into a similar social stratum. This discrimination is therefore
not entirely about class cleavage; rather, it is a socialised con-
frontation between rural and urban identity. 
Discrimination against migrants as alleged sources of social
problems or even as pollutants of the city is not going to
bring a progressive and modern city, however. Qin insists
that the achievements of Haussmannisation in Paris have
been exaggerated, while its drawbacks have never been fully
addressed. A lot of effort, including the provision of public
housing and more responsive governance, was expended in
the post-Haussmann era to alleviate the social tensions gen-
erated by the reconstruction. Recent research has also
proved that Paris’s modernised water supply and sewage sys-
tem — a crux of Haussmannisation — was not accomplished
until the 1890s. (25) During this period of time, Paris also suf-
fered from the continuous threat of cholera beneath the ve-
neer of a modern hygienic city. (26) In other words, if Chinese
civic planners mistakenly treat Haussmannisation as the de-
fault path to the modernised city, then they are not only
guilty of a conceptual fallacy, but they may also trigger the
severe social discontent that occurred in the late Second
French Empire. China ’s  a pa rt hei d a nd w el far e
Besides Haussmannisation, apartheid is another analogy
raised by Qin to reflect the injustice against migrants. The
term “China’s apartheid” is used by scholars to describe
how China’s hukou system has divided the population into
two distinct groups, urban and rural. (27) While not making ex-
plicit reference to the hukou system as “China’s apartheid,”
Qin addresses South Africa’s Soweto as a “mirror” of insti-
tutional discrimination in China. (28) He offers the dynamic
transformation of Soweto to justify the benefits of slums in
Chinese cities. Not only would they encourage the provision
of welfare benefits to migrants, they would also enable the
organic flourishing of the group as a socio-political entity. (29)
Before the termination of apartheid in South Africa, Johan-
nesburg was a peaceful and organised city that was reserved
for whites. Blacks were denied entrance to the city and en-
joyed social, economic, and political rights that were largely
inferior to those of whites. (30) Rapid economic development
and urbanisation after WWII, however, led to increased de-
mand for workers in labour-intensive, low-skilled jobs that ed-
ucated whites were unwilling to take, and the burden was
placed on blacks. The government authorities enclosed a
sub-rural area southwest of Johannesburg to enable blacks to
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serve white citizens effectively and efficiently. The area orig-
inally referred to as the South Western Township was abbre-
viated Soweto in the 1960s and gradually developed into an
area that housed 1.6 million people by the 1980s. (31) Qin
states: “If Johannesburg is . . . Paradise; Soweto is . . . Hell.”
However, he also notes that the existence of a communal
network and a responsive and representative government has
in recent years led to many improvements in Soweto that
have significantly altered the situation. (32)
For instance, the largest bus station in Africa is now situated
in Soweto. At Christmas time, hundreds and thousands of
workers stream into this station looking for a ticket home. The
situation is very similar to what occurs in China before the
Lunar New Year, when migrants rush back to their home
counties. However, although the phenomenon is similar, the
composition of the migrants leaving Soweto is different from
that in China. Most of them are actually foreign workers from
Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe rather
than South African citizens. (33) Since the abolition of
apartheid, South African nationals working in the area have
their own houses, albeit crowded and cramped ones, in
Soweto or Johannesburg. (34) Thus, they no longer have the
problem of going home (huijia), because their homes are
where they live and work. The huijia issue is one that trou-
bles nearly every Chinese migrant, and one that would be re-
solved for their families and local authorities if they were
given the opportunity to form their own communities. 
It seems that Qin is making the claim that the transforma-
tion of Soweto is not a direct result of the abolition of
apartheid. Instead, the existence of a living space devoted
solely to the black community — serving, inspiring, and uni-
fying it — contributed dynamically to the anti-apartheid
movement. Since 1994, blacks have enjoyed equal citizen-
ship rights to whites, and slums can now be built in both
Soweto and Johannesburg. Studies have shown, however,
that the separate squatter areas and slums that emerged in
the 1960s became breeding grounds for anti-apartheid lead-
ers such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu. (35) They gave blacks
the opportunity to identify with their locality, to become vis-
ible to the nation and to the world, and to become recog-
nised as an exploited group. The National Party of South
Africa intended to eliminate Soweto, as they had done to
the Western Township, to cover up the troubles, but this led
to severe resistance. (36) Given the South African experience,
the underlying question is whether the restriction of slums is
more justified than their formation. For Qin, only an ex-
posed and visible grievance, not a cover-up, can provoke
recognition of migrants’ rights. (37)
T he  de nie rs ,  t he sce p tics ,  thei dea li sts,  a nd t he po lit ics  ofr e cognit ion
Qin’s proposal has aroused intense and diverse debate. Pub-
lic opinion, as expressed in a number of newspaper articles,
is overwhelmingly positive towards the formation of slums as
a legitimate way to guarantee migrants’ rights and welfare
(quanli); to enable the floating population to settle down (an-
shen); to promote the assimilation (ronghe) of the rural and
urban populations; and to show humanitarian concern to-
wards the exploited. (38) Despite their different perspectives,
all of these writers share the view that the current situation is
intolerable; action, rather than patience, is needed. (39) Three
types of counter responses have also been documented, how-
ever, each with a different socio-political orientation. 
The first group is composed of deniers who represent the of-
ficial view or insist on the improvement of migrants’ rights.
For this group, the creation of slums is either a lazy or crazy
idea that refuses to consider the crisis realistically. (40) Qi Ji,
a deputy minister of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development, denies any possibility of allowing slums.
He insists it is the government’s policy to resolve the hous-
ing problem step by step. This means first allocating re-
sources to urban households, then extending them to perma-
nent residents, ultimately including the floating population if
resources permit. (41)
Undoubtedly, some promising measures have been taken,
such as the education of migrants’ children, addressing
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abuse of migrants, and the provision of emergency medical
services. However, the announcement by the Beijing munic-
ipality of its intention to eliminate the distinction between
agricultural and non-agricultural hukou status may give rise to
unrealistic expectations. (42) Similar changes have occurred in
the other 12 provinces, but none of them has abolished
hukou identification entirely. The registration requirement
for permanent residency remains intact, and migrants still
have to satisfy the criteria set by local authorities to obtain a
local hukou and thus enjoy social security benefits. (43) For in-
stance, the annual minimum wage in urban Beijing is 4,680
Yuan, whereas that for rural Beijing areas is 1,780 Yuan. (44)
Indeed, the current hukou reform is an extension of the
State Council reform of 1997, which allowed the transfer of
hukou from a rural to an urban area provided that the mi-
grant has 1) a stable source of income and 2) a stable place
of residence. In addition, the applicant has to 3) work in a
secondary or tertiary industry, 4) work in management or
professional services, and 5) own an apartment. This prac-
tice was extended to all towns and cities in 2001. (45)
Because this executive ordinance fails to define a stable in-
come or specify the value of the property that must be
owned, local authorities are given the discretion to set re-
spective limits. In Wuxi, for instance, to obtain an urban
hukou an applicant must own a 100 m2 apartment, have
paid 10,000 Yuan in taxes for two consecutive years, or be
employed in a profession that is urgently needed by the
city. (46) These requirements are far beyond the capacity of
the majority of migrants. For example, only 2 percent of
the 2 million migrants in Ningbo — one of the wealthiest
cities in China and a model for hukou reform — have suc-
cessfully transferred to an urban hukou. (47) As an article
from China Labour Bulletin states, “instead of granting cit-
izens the right to internal migration, in effect, the policy
was more of an immigration scheme to attract investment
and talent.” (48) The deniers’ hasty or deliberate focus on
the word “slum” has allowed them to overlook its inherent
rights-based inference. The criterion for judgment is always
how much is given by the government, but never on
whether migrants should be entitled to particular rights in
the first place. 
The second group of critics, although agreeing with the ap-
propriateness of Qin’s concerns, remains sceptical about the
feasibility of allowing the formation of slums. These com-
mentators worry that it would have the effect of labelling mi-
grants and thus further intensify the division between the
haves and the have-nots. (49) Due to migrants’ economic limi-
tations and the scarcity of urban resources, they predict that
slums would tend to be located in suburbs without a sustain-
able threshold of public services or sufficient job opportuni-
ties. They note that some migrant workers in Guangzhou
have abandoned the squatter areas and low-rent housing
(lian zufang) provided by local authorities because of the
high travelling costs and the dangerous neighbourhoods in
which they are located. (50) In the long run, they say, migrants
and more particularly their offspring would be stuck in the
slum and feel ashamed of their identity. (51)
Although these critics make quite general assertions, their
worries are not totally unjustified. Qin from the beginning
foresaw the possibility of slum deterioration and the way
local authorities would deal with it. Numerous urban villages
(chengzhongcun) have actually formed in the city centres of
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. Function-
ally, they are identical to slums in their provision of afford-
able shelter and primitive services to migrants. (52) These
chengzhongcun, however, are often regarded as sources of
crime, crowding, and poverty by urban citizens; thus, local
authorities have the motivation to clean them up, as they can
then take credit for making progress. Very few of them have
considered that urbanisation, poverty, and crowding may
have caused chengzhongcun, rather than resulted from them.
Without a formal recognition of migrants’ rights, it is difficult
to reverse such orthodox thinking from the public discourse.
This explains why Qin, while not indicating who should lead
the construction of migrant housing, frequently stresses the
responsibility of government to offer welfare provisions for
all inhabitants. A transformative reform put forward by the
state centre is still the best available safeguard against future
local policy reversal. 
88 N o  2 0 0 8 / 4
42. Xinhua News Agency, 31 December 2008. 
43. CECC, op. cit. 
44. Beijing Commercial Daily, 31 December 2008, p. 1.
45. “State Council notice on approving the Public Security Bureau’s opinions on promoting
reform on the management of household registration system in small towns and cities,”
issued 30 March 2001. 
46. Wuxi City Government Notice of Issuance of the City Public Security Bureau’s “Instruc-
tion to obtain a local Hukou.” Retrieved on 16 January 2008.
47. Southern Weekly, 31 August 2001. 
48. CLB, op. cit. 
49. Chen Yizhou, “Segregation of the rich from the poor should not be the price for project-
ing the rights of the underprivileged,” Southern Metropolitan Daily, 14 April 2008, p. A2;
Bige, “Construction of slums might lead to more dualistic separation,” Chun Cheng
Evening News, p. A3; Wang Jiafeng “What kind of residences do urban migrant workers
need?” Jie Fang Daily, 22 April 2008, p. 7.
50. Bige, op. cit. 
51. Chen Yizhou, op. cit.
52. L. Zhang and S. Zhao, “Self-help in Housing and Urban Villages in China’s Urbanization,”











City Slums as a Recognition of Migrants’ Rights
Idealists make up the third group. Admittedly, these critics
include those who are concerned with the well-being of mi-
grants and those who believe that liberty, fairness, and
democracy should be the criteria for evaluating and recom-
mending policy. At the same time, however, they believe
that little can be done under the current socio-political struc-
ture. Their perspective can be summed up by the title of an
article by one of these respondents, Tao Duanfang: “Ad-
vancing 100 steps or 50 steps is not a matter of substantial
difference.” (53) Tao uses the insignificant distinction between
born slaves and contract slaves as an analogy to show that
the creation of slums is an eclectic process that does not ex-
empt migrants from institutional and societal discrimination.
If there is only a minimal provision of goods and services in
periphery and state-initiated squatter areas, then this might
actually reinforce the exploitative relationship without pro-
viding any possibility for the long-term development of mi-
grants. In Qin’s view, however, the dynamic development of
Soweto justifies an optimistic view of slum creation. The ex-
istence of slums would enable the political recognition of mi-
grants as an inalienable part of the Chinese city and the Chi-
nese population. Hence, the divergence between the opin-
ions of Qin and those of the idealists is not whether migrants
are entitled to basic civic and political rights; it is whether
these rights should be complemented by welfare provisions
and a decent standard of living. Qin calls for dynamic devel-
opment towards an end, whereas the idealists call for the im-
mediate arrival of that end. 
Contrary to the deniers who are merely spokesmen of the
administration, Qin does not believe that rights are granted
by the state. But he seems convinced that the state, rather
than the market or civil society, is a more suitable policy ini-
tiator for slum formation. At the same time, he does not
share the view of some of the sceptics who advocate a sort
of communitarian affirmative action for migrants. Rather, he
aims at universal equal treatment for the rural and urban
populations. Nonetheless, the universal concern does not
make him an authentic liberal or idealist. For Qin, rights are
neither a natural entitlement nor a mere contractual provi-
sion. (54)
All in all, Qin is a historian and a social activist. As a histo-
rian, he emphasises the complexity of acquiring rights and
the difficulty in gaining recognition for them. Therefore, the
dynamic struggle of Soweto is used to demonstrate the mer-
its of having an inspirational, provocative, and visible physi-
cal structure for the disadvantaged. Allowing the formation
of slums in China is aimed at delivering an endowment for
future socio-political recognition and welfare delivery for mi-
grants. As a social activist, he knows how to set an agenda
for deliberation. By choosing the slum — a seemly negative
word — he has challenged the “progressive” discourse asso-
ciated with Haussmannisation. Availing at the critical mo-
ment when a new wave of rural-urban migration is about to
be triggered by the recent Land Reform (diquan gaige),
under which peasants are entitled to transfer their land rights
to any party, his notion, even if it does not entail immediate
policy implication, has set the context for deliberation on mi-
grants’ rights in the public discourse. •
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Glossary
Qin Hui 秦暉
pinmin ku 貧民窟
gaige kaifang 改革開放
hukou 戶口
Xinyang 信陽
huijia 回家
quanli 權利
anshen 安身
ronghe 融合
Wuxi 無錫
Ningbo 寧波
chengzhongcun 城中村
Tao Duanfang 陶短房
diquan gaige 地權改革
